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ABSTRACT In the last decades, several signcryption schemes have been developed for different privacy-
enhancing purposes. In this paper, we propose a new privacy-enhancing group signcryption scheme
that provides: unforgeability, confidentiality, ciphertext and sender anonymity, traceability, unlinkability,
exculpability, coalition-resistance, and unforgeable tracing verification. It is important to notice that the
proposed scheme allows a signer to anonymously signcrypt a message on the group’s behalf (i.e., sender’s
anonymity). The security analysis of the scheme is also provided. Our proposal is proven to be strongly
existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack, indistinguishable under an adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack, and to provide ciphertext anonymity under an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
Furthermore, the scheme is extended to work in a multi-receiver scenario, where an authorized group of
receivers is able to unsigncrypt the ciphertext. The experimental results show that our scheme is efficient
even on computationally restricted devices and can be therefore used in many IoT applications. The
Signcrypt protocol on smart cards takes less than 1 s (including communication overhead). The time
of the Unsigncrypt protocol on current ARM devices is negligible (less than 40 ms).
INDEX TERMS Anonymity, embedded devices, group signature, privacy-enhancing technology, signcryp-
tion protocol, smart cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
A signcryption scheme [45] combines a digital signature
and a public-key encryption scheme with a lower compu-
tational and communication overhead than traditional sing-
then-encrypt scheme. Most of the traditional signcryption
protocols are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. These
schemes guarantee data confidentiality and integrity, as well
as signature unforgeability. In signcryption protocols, users’
privacy is basically achieved by ciphertext anonymity which
means that the ciphertext reveals no information about who
created it nor about whom it is intended to [45]. In other
words, the problem is to hide sender’s and receiver’s identity
to an outsider. The use of bilinear pairing in a signcryp-
tion protocol allows achieving ciphertext anonymity property
at the expense of speed, e.g., see [14], [37], [39]. How-
ever, many schemes require an even stronger anonymity.
For instance, in the case of e-voting, the voter’s (sender’s)
identity has to be hidden also to the receiver as well as in
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Pierluigi Gallo .
the case of video streaming applications where anonymous
users (senders) broadcast live video to the Internet. In other
words, we should be able to identify malicious users, e.g.,
users who broadcast a video with prohibited content, while
keeping honest-user identity hidden. Group signatures can
help us with that. In fact, group signatures allow providing
data authenticity without disclosing users’ identities. In par-
ticular, a user can anonymously sign a message on behalf of
the group. Therefore, our scheme uses group signature and
bilinear maps in order to provide ciphertext anonymity plus
sender anonymity.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Most of the standard (i.e., one-to-one) signcryption proto-
cols propose a bilinear pairing strategy in order to reach
stronger anonymity property. In fact, the use of bilinear
pairing in a signcryption protocol allows achieving cipher-
text anonymity property at the expense of speed. Libert
and Quisquater [28], [45] propose a scheme based on pair-
ing which is only partially anonymous. In fact, an outsider
cannot identify who was the sender but knows who the
receiver is, and the receiver needs sender’s public-key to
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unsigncrypt the message. Therefore, the scheme does not
achieve sender’s anonymity. Later, Chaudhari and Das [14]
introduce a pairing-based scheme where the sender and
the receivers identities are protected against an outsider,
i.e., the scheme guarantees ciphertext anonymity. This pro-
posal can be suitable for a multi-receiver environment, where
only authorized receivers can decrypt the ciphertext and ver-
ify the signature. However, this scheme does not also provide
sender’s anonymity. Finally, Braeken and Touhafi [10] pro-
pose a fast signcryption scheme based on the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem. As in any non-pairing scheme,
the anonymity is only partially achieved, i.e. the sender’s
identity is known by the receiver.
Most of themulti-receiver (i.e., one-to-many) signcryption
schemes generate different encryptions of the same mes-
sage, that is one ciphertext for each authorized receiver.
These ciphertexts are then concatenated in one, which is
broadcasted. Therefore, if some part of the ciphertext goes
wrong during transmission, only some authorized receivers
can decrypt the message correctly while the rest cannot. This
leads to the unfair decryption problem [38]. Pang et al. [37]
present a pairing-based scheme where each receiver needs
the whole ciphertext for decryption. However, the identity
of the sender is disclosed by an authorized receiver after
decryption. Moreover, in order to hide receivers’ identity to
an outsider, the Lagrange interpolation polynomial was also
considered [24]. The unique ciphertext can be decrypted by
any authorized receiver who owns a root of the interpolation
polynomial. Later, this method was used in several anony-
mous multi-receiver signcryption schemes [27], [38], [44].
Unluckily, Li and Pang [26] pointed out that any scheme
based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial methodology
cannot achieve the receiver’s anonymity and, accordingly,
ciphertext anonymity. In fact, every authorized receiver can
determinewhether the other is one of the authorized receivers.
To our knowledge, no current signcryption scheme could
combine ciphertext anonymity and fair decryption.
Ring signcryption schemes were presented more recently.
Huang et al. [20] propose to combine pairing-based sign-
cryption scheme with ring signature. In this case, a sender
can anonymously signcrypt a message on behalf of the group.
However, the receiver’s identity is not hidden to an outsider.
Saraswat et al. [39] also present an anonymous proxy sign-
cryption scheme based on pairing and ring signature. This
scheme works in a different scenario, and it is only required
ciphertext anonymity. Li et al. [25] also propose a scheme
where sender’s and receiver’s identities are hidden to an out-
sider. Their scheme is designed to be efficient on the sender
side and suitable for wireless body area networks.
At last, only a few articles dealt with group signcryp-
tion schemes. Mu and Varadharajan [33] propose a dis-
tributed signcryption scheme based on ElGamal encryption
and Schnorr’s digital signature. The scheme is then extended
to a group signcryption protocol. However, Kwak et al. [23]
proves that Mu-Varadharajan does not provide exculpabil-
ity security property, i.e., the group manager can signcrypt
on the behalf of other group members. Furthermore, Kwak
and Moon develop a new distributed signcryption scheme
with sender anonymity and extend it to a group signcryp-
tion scheme [22]. However, Bao et al. [3] demonstrate that
Kwak’s and Moon’s scheme is insecure. In particular, the
scheme does not provide unforgeability, coalition-resistance,
and traceability security properties. Then Kwak et al. over-
come the aforementioned security flaws in [23]. They
present a new encrypted group signature scheme based
on Ateniese-Camenisch-Joye-Tsudik (ACJT) group sig-
nature [2], Bresson-Chevassut-Essiari-Pointcheval (BCEP)
group key agreement protocol [11], and ElGamal cryp-
tosystem [16]. The scheme is defined by the authors as an
‘‘encrypted group signature scheme’’ and follows the tradi-
tional sign-then-encrypt mechanism. At first, the user gen-
erates the ACJT group signature on the message. Then the
user encrypts it, together with the message, by using the sym-
metric cipher. The encryption key is encrypted by ElGamal
cryptosystem and delivered to the targeted group, where each
member knows the decryption key. Moreover, the decryption
key is distributed within the group by BCEP protocol. The
scheme provides data confidentiality and unforgeability sim-
ilarly to a signcryption scheme. Unfortunately, this scheme
does not provide lower computational and communicational
overhead due to its sequential sign-then-encrypt nature. Fur-
thermore, the scheme is not suitable for constrained devices
in the Internet of Thing (IoT) since it is based on Integer
Factorization (IF) problem which is not portable to Ellip-
tic Curve (EC) constructions. The ACJT scheme has also
high computational requirements as shown in [30]. Plain
Kwak et al. [23] encrypted group signature scheme is then
used by Cho and Toshiba [15] to build a verifiable group
sygncryption scheme with deduplicable properties for data
stored in a cloud service provider. It is remarkable that our
scheme can be an efficient alternative to be deployed in
Cho-Toshiba’s scheme. At last, Mohanty et al. [32] present a
signcryption protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem.
The scheme tries to provide also the user’s anonymity. In par-
ticular, the identity of the sender is hidden to the receiver and
an outsider. In order to achieve this kind-of-anonymity, the
scheme requires an active group manager who is involved
in the signcryption phase. This manager’s involvement can
lead to privacy leakage and slow down the computation,
and therefore, it is normally avoided. However, the scheme
presents several security flows as discussed in Appendix E.
Table 1 shows a comparison of existing signcryption
schemes. Observe that in the table two anonymity types are
considered: 1) ciphertext anonymity, i.e., sender’s identity
is hidden to an outsider as well as receiver’s identity to an
outsider, and 2) sender anonymity, i.e., sender’s identity is
hidden not only to an outsider but also to the receiver. The
level of privacy achieved by the below schemes depends on
howmany anonymity types they cover. Note that the property
‘‘receiver’s identity is hidden to the sender’’ is not contem-
plated in the previous list because it is normally supposed that
the sender knows the identity of the receiver of its message.
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TABLE 1. Main features of related work on anonymous signcryption schemes: scheme, security assumption, anonymity property, multi-receiver scenario
support and number of bilinear pairings used in the corresponding scheme. ‘‘DH’’ stands for ‘‘Diffie-Hellman problem’’, ‘‘pair.’’ for ‘‘bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem’’, ‘‘interp-pair.’’ for ‘‘bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem combined with Lagrange interpolation polynomial method’’, ‘‘ring-pair.’’ for ‘‘bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem combined with ring signature’’, ‘‘EC’’ for ‘‘Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem’’, ‘‘group-pair.’’ for ‘‘bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem combined with group signature’’, ‘‘group-DH’’ for ‘‘Diffie-Hellman problem combined with group signature’’, ‘‘S-to-R’’ for ‘‘sender’s identity is
hidden to the receiver’’, similarly for ‘‘S-to-O’’ and ‘‘R-to-O’’ where ‘‘O’’ stands for ‘‘outsider’’. The number of pairings is given depending on who is
computing it. For instance, ‘‘3S+7R’’ stands for ‘‘3 pairings computed by the sender and 7 by the receiver’’; ‘‘n’’ is the number of users in the ring.
TABLE 2. Security comparison of available group signcryption schemes.
In Table 1, we consider only provable secure signcryption
schemes. In particular, Mu and Varadharajan sheme [33] does
not provide exculpability, and Kwak et al. [22] scheme does
not provide traceability, coalition-resistance and unforgeabil-
ity. Furthermore, we also prove that the Mohanty et al. [32]
scheme presents security flows, i.e., it does not provide
unforgeability, confidentiality, exculpability nor traceability.
See Appendix E for more details. The security of the state-
of-the-art schemes is depicted in detail in Table 2.
A. CONTRIBUTION AND PAPER STRUCTURE
In [19], we proposed a novel group signature scheme based
on the weak Boneh-Boyen signature [9] and the efficient
proofs of knowledge [13]. This scheme has fast signature
generation and provides all the main privacy-enhancing sig-
nature features, i.e., anonymity, unlinkability, traceability,
and coalition-resistance. The present article extends this
work, where the proposed signature is included in our
signcryption scheme. Accordingly, the new signcryption
scheme holds all the properties of the aforementioned group
signature scheme. Our lightweight privacy-preserving group
signcryption scheme can find use in particular in IoT
environments, where many computationally and memory-
constrained devices are employed.
Our novel signcryption scheme guarantees ciphertext and
sender anonymity. This is achieved by combining the Ellip-
tic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [18] with
our group signature [19]. Furthermore, our signcryption
scheme supports the multi-receiver scenario and guarantees
fair decryption to all authorized receivers.
The main properties of the scheme are summarized below.
Privacy-enhancing main features:
• ciphertext anonymity, i.e., sender and receiver identity
is hidden to an outsider;
• sender anonymity, i.e., the sender’s identity is hidden
not only to an outsider but also to the receiver. In this
way, instead of sender authentication, group authen-
tication is provided to achieve message integrity and
verification of the sender;
• traceability, i.e., the manager is able to trace which user
signcrypt the message.
• unlinkability, i.e., two or more signcryptions cannot be
addressed to the same or different senders;
Other features:
• the Signcrypt algorithm is fast: it requires no bilinear
pairing and only 6 exponentiations;
• the Unsigncrypt algorithm is efficient: it requires
only 2 pairings;
• the group manager is able to identify the signer by
opening the signcryption;
• the scheme is compatible with current revocation tech-
niques such as [13];
• the scheme can be adapted to a multi-receiver scenario;
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• the scheme is built by using primitives with formal
security proofs;
• security analyses of the scheme are provided.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section III
discusses some preliminaries. Section IV lists the signcryp-
tion properties and security models. Section V shows the
basic structure of the proposed scheme and lists the inte-
grated cryptographic primitives with their functionalities.
Section VI presents the proposed scheme. Section VII shows
how the scheme can be adapted to a multi-receiver sce-
nario. Section VIII provides the security analysis of the
scheme. Section IX discusses possible use cases for our pro-
posal. Section X shows the comparison with closely-related
signcrytion schemes. Section XI reports the experimental
results. The final section contains the conclusions.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, at first, we outline the used notation and the
security assumptions needed to understand our scheme and
our security proofs. At second, we briefly introduce bilin-
ear pairing maps and weak Boneh-Boyen (wBB) signature
which are used throughout all sections. Then we review
the protocols on which our scheme is based, namely our
lightweight group signature [19], a Non-Interactive Zero-
Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (NIZKPK) [7], the Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [18], and the
BCEP group key agreement protocol [11]. At last, we refresh
the structure of a signcryption protocol.
From now on, the symbol ‘‘:’’ means ‘‘such that’’, ‘‘|x|’’ is
the bitlength of x and ‘‘||’’ denotes the concatenation of two
binary strings. We write a←$ Awhen a is sampled uniformly
at random from A. A secure hash function is denoted as
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ , where κ is a security parameter.
We describe the proof of knowledge protocols (PK) using the
notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler (CS) [12]. The
protocol for proving the knowledge of discrete logarithm of
c with respect to g is denoted as PK{α : c = gα}.
A. HARD PROBLEMS
In this section, we describe some security assumptions used
in the proposed scheme. Let G1, G2, and GT be groups of
prime order q, g be a generator of G1, and g2 be a generator
of G2. In the first assumption, G1 is taken equal to G2 and,
therefore, g = g2.
1) DECISIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DDH) PROBLEM
Given 〈g, ga, gb, gc〉 for some a, b, c ∈ Zq, determine
whether c ≡ ab mod q.
Definition 1 (DDH Assumption): Let B be an algorithm
with output in {0, 1}, which has advantage
AdvDDHB = Pr[u, v← {0, . . . q} : B(g, g
u, gv, guv) = 1]
−Pr[u, v← {0, . . . q}; h← B : B(g, gu, gv, h) = 1]
in solving the DDH problem. If for any t-time algorithm
the advantage AdvDDHB is negligible (≤ ε), we say that the
(q, t, ε)-DDH assumption holds.
See [41] for more details on the DDH assumption.
2) STRONG DIFFIE-HELLMAN (p-SDH) PROBLEM
Given as input a (p+ 3)-tuple of elements
(g, gx , gx
2
, . . . , gx
p





compute a pair (c, g1/(x+c)) ∈ Zq × G1 for some value c ∈
Zq r {x}.
Definition 2 (p-SDH Assumption): Let B be an algorithm
with advantage
Advp-SDHB = Pr[B(g, g
x , gx
2




in solving the p-SDH problem. If for any t-time algorithm
the advantage Advp-SDHB is negligible (≤ ε), we say that the
(p, t, ε)-SDH assumption holds.
See [9] for more details on p-SDH assumption.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G1, G2, and GT be groups of prime order q. A bilinear
map e : G1 ×G2→ GT must satisfy:
• bilinearity: e(gx , gy2) = e(g, g2)
xy for all x, y ∈ Zq;
• non-degeneracy: for all generators g ∈ G1 and g2 ∈
G2, e(g, g2) generates GT ;
• computability: there exists an efficient algorithm G(1k )
to compute e(g, g2) for all g ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2.
By definition (q,G1,G2,GT , e, g, g2) is a bilinear group
if it satisfies all above properties. In this article, we consider
the case G1 6= G2 that is when e is an asymmetric bilinear
map and DDH assumption hold. Moreover, having G1 6= G2
permits to obtain the shortest possible signature (check [9] for
more details).
C. WEAK BONEH-BOYEN SIGNATURE
The wBB signature scheme is a pairing-based short signature
scheme. This signature was proven existentially unforgeable
against a weak (non-adaptive) chosen message attack under
the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [9]. The scheme can
be used to efficiently sign messages and can be also inte-
grated with the zero-knowledge proofs [13]. In this way, the
knowledge of signed messages can be proven anonymously,
and unlinkably. The wBB signature is briefly depicted below:
• (pks, sk, par) ← KeyGen(1κ ): on the input of the
system security parameter κ , the algorithm generates a
bilinear group par = (q,G1,G2,GT , e, g, g2), com-
putes pks = gsk2 where sk ←
$ Zq, and outputs sk as the
private key and (pks, par) as the public key.
• (σ ) ← Sign(m, par, sk): on the input of the message
m ∈ Zq, the system security parameters par and the
secret key sk , the algorithm outputs the signature of the
message σ = g
1
sk+m .
• (1/0) ← Verify(σ,m, pks, par): on the input of the
system security parameters par , the public key pks, a sig-
nature σ and a messagem, the algorithm returns 1 if and
only if e(σ, pks) · e(σm, g2) = e(g, g2) holds, i.e. the
signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
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D. LIGHTWEIGHT GROUP SIGNATURE
In our previous article [19], we develop a fast group signature
based on wBB proposal. Our signature allows a signer to
generate an anonymous signature σ (ski,m) on a message m,
where ski is the signer’s private key. The protocol works as
follows:
• (pk, skm, par)← Setup(1κ ): on the input of the secu-
rity parameter κ , the algorithm generates the bilinear
group with parameters par = (q,G1,G2,GT , e, g ∈
G1, g2 ∈ G2) satisfying |q| = κ . It also generates the
manager’s private key skm ←$ Zq and computes the
public key pk = gskm2 . It outputs the (pk, par) as a public
output and the skm as the manager’s private output.
• (ski, rd) ← KeyGen(idi, skm): on the input of man-
ager’s private key skm and signer’s private identifier idi.
The protocol outputs the wBB signature ski = g
1
skm+idi
to the signer and updates the manager’s revocation
database rd by storing idi.
• σ (ski,m) ← Sign(m, idi, ski): on the inputs the
signer’s private identifier idi, signer’s private key ski,
and the message m, the algorithm outputs the signature
σ (ski,m) = (g′, sk ′i , ¯ski, π), where:
– g′ = gr : the generator raised to a randomly chosen
randomizer r ←$ Zq.
– sk ′i = sk
r
i : the signers’ private key raised to the
randomizer.
– ¯ski = sk ′i
−idi : the randomized private key raised to
the signer identifier.
– π = PK {(idi, r) : ¯ski = sk ′i
−idi
∧ g′ =
gr }(m): proof of knowledge of r and idi signing the
message m.
• 0/1 ← Verify(σ (ski,m),m, pk, bl): on the input of
the message m, its signature σ (ski,m), a blacklist bl,
and the public key pk , the algorithm checks the proof
of knowledge signature π and checks that the signature
is valid with respect to the manager’s public key using
the equation e( ¯skig′, g2)
?
= e(sk ′i , pk). The collector also
performs the revocation check sk ′i
?
= ¯ski
idi for all idi
values stored on the blacklist bl. If the revocation check
equation holds for any value on the blacklist, the signa-
ture is rejected. Otherwise, the signature is accepted if
all other checks pass.
In the above algorithm, the manager knows the signer’s
private key ski. In our signcryption protocol, we overcome
this issue and we achieve the exculpability feature of the
signature. Therefore, the manager is not able to signcrypt a
message on behalf of any group signer. Note that traceability
of malicious signers remains possible.
E. NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF OF
KNOWLEDGE (NIZKPK) OF AN AUTHENTICATOR
The following NIZKPK [7] allows two entities, namely the
manager and the sender, to jointly compute a Boneh-Boyen
signature σ = g1/(K+m) of a sender’s private message m
and the manager’s secret key K . Let Cm be a commitment
on the message m created by the sender. Let Keygen, Enc,
and Dec be an additively homomorphic semantically secure
encryption scheme. Let⊕ denote the homomorphic operation
on ciphertexts and e ⊗ r denote ‘‘adding’’ a ciphertext e to
itself r times, where r is an integer. The NIZKPK scheme is
briefly depicted below:
• On the input of the system security parameter κ , the
manager generates (pkh, skh) ← KeyGen(1κ ) in such
a way that the message space is of size at least 2κq2,
where |q| = κ .
• The manager computes e1 = Enc(pkh,K ) and sends
e1, pkh to the sender.
• The manager and the sender engage in an interactive
zero-knowledge proof that e1 encrypts to a messagem ∈
[0, q].
• The sender chooses r1 ←$ Zq and r2 ←$ {0, . . . , 2κq}
and computes
e2 = ((e1 ⊕ Enc(pkh,m))⊗ r1)⊕ Enc(pkh, r2q),
and sends e2 to the manager.
• The manager and the sender perform an interactive zero-
knowledge proof in which the sender shows that e2
has been correctly computed using the message in the
commitment Cm, and that r1, r2 are in the appropriate
ranges.
• Themanager decrypts x = Dec(skh, e2) and sends σ ∗ =
g1/x to the sender.
• The sender computes σ = (σ ∗)r1 and verifies that it is
a correct wBB signature on m. Note that the manager
obtains no information on m.
Belenkiy et al. [7] prove that this construction is a secure
two-party computation of Boneh-Boyen signature.Moreover,
they show how NIZKPK can be efficiently implemented
using Paillier cryptosystem [36] for their delegatable anony-
mous credentials scheme. We refer to [7] for more details.
Note that NIZKPK can be easily adapted to work with our
signcryption scheme.
F. ELLIPTIC CURVE INTEGRATED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
(ECIES)
ECIES [18] is an efficient and provable-secure encryption
scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm prob-
lem. Let G denote a group of prime order q with gen-
erator g. Then the public system parameters are par =
(G, g, q). The scheme needs a symmetric encryption scheme
SYM = (Ek ,DK ), a message authentication codeMACk , and
a key derivation function KDF . The ECIES scheme is briefly
depicted below:
• (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(par): on the input of the sys-
tem parameters par , the protocol randomly chooses the
secret key v←$ Zq and computes the public key pk = gv.
• (e) ← Enc(par, pk,m): on the input of the public key
pk and a message m, the protocol randomly chooses
x ←$ Zq and computes u = gx and t = pkx . Then it
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computes the keys (k1, k2) = KDF(t) which are used for
encrypting the message c = Ek1 (m) and for generating
the message authentication code r = MACk2 (c) of
ciphertext c. The algorithm outputs e = u||r||c.
• (⊥ /m) ← Dec(par, sk, e): on the input of the secret
key sk and the ciphertext c, the protocol parses e as
u||r||c, and computes t = usk and (k1, k2) = KDF(t).
If r = MACk2 (c), then the algorithm returnsm = Dk1 (c),
otherwise invalid ⊥.
In addition to proving that the algorithm is secure,
Smart [41] provides several specifications on the choice
of SYM and KDF . Our signcryption scheme builds on the
ECIES scheme and takes into consideration Smart’s recom-
mendations.
G. BCEP GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
The BCEP group key agreement protocol [11] is an effi-
cient and provable-secure group key agreement protocol.
The scheme security is based Computational Diffie–Hellman
(CDH) problem. Furthermore, the scheme requires the
employment of a secure signature scheme. Let G denote a
group of prime order qwith generator g. The BCEP algorithm
is run between a User (Ui) (in user group GU ) and a Server S
which will be renamed in our protocol as a Receiver and the
Receiver Group Manager, respectively. The BCEP scheme is
briefly depicted below:
• The user Ui generates xi ←$ Zq and computes yi = gxi .
Then the user generates the signature σi on the value yi
and sends (σi, yi) to the server.
• The server generates a random xs ←$ Zq and com-
putes ys = gxs . The server verifies the signature (σi, yi)
for each user Ui and computes αi = y
xs
i . Then the
server initializes the counter c = 0, as a bit-string of
length `1, and computes the shared secret value k =
H0(c||α1|| . . . ||αn), where the H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`0
is a secure hash function with output length `0 and n is
the number of users.
• Finally, the server computes ki = k ⊕H1(c||αi), where
H1 : {0, 1}`1 × G → {0, 1}`0 is a secure hash func-
tion, where `1 is the maximal bit-length of a counter
c used to prevent replay attacks. The server signs the
message mi = c||ki||ys and sends (mi, σs) to each
user.
• Each userUi verifies the signature (mi, σs) and computes
αi = y
xi
s in order to recover the shared secret key k and
the session key sk as depicted below:
k = ki ⊕H1(c||αi),
sk = H2(k||GU ||S),
where H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`2 is a secure hash
function with output length `2 that need not be equal
to `0.
This algorithm is integrated without modifications in our
multi-receiver group signcryption protocol. See Section VII
for more details.
H. SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we briefly refresh the structure of a sign-
cryption protocol. A traditional signcryption protocol con-
sists of at least four basic algorithms: Setup, KeyGen,
Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt. In particular, for a fixed
security parameter, these algorithms work as follows:
(pks, par) ← Setup(1κ ): on the input of the security
parameter κ , the algorithm outputs the public system
security parameters par and the group public key pks.
(sks, pks, pkr , skr ) ← KeyGen(par): on the input of
par , generates sender’s secret and public keys (sks, pks),
and receiver’s key pair (pkr , skr ).
(c, σ )← Signcrypt(par, sks, pkr ,m): on the input of
par , sks and pkr and a message m, outputs a ciphertext c
and a signature σ .
(1/0,m)← Unsigncrypt(par, c, σ, pks, skr ): on the
input of par , c, σ , pks and skr , verifies the signature σ
and decrypts the ciphertext c. It returns 1 and m iff the
signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
IV. SECURITY MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
In this section, the signcryption security model and secu-
rity requirements are presented. At first, basic and privacy-
enhancing properties of a group sygncryption scheme are
listed and delineated. Then Strong Existential Unforge-
ability (sUF), Indistinguishability (IND), and Ciphertext
anonymity (ANON) are described in detail.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In general, a group signcryption protocol should have the
following security properties:
• Correctness: Valid signcryptions generated by group
members are always accepted via a verification process,
while invalid signcryptions always fail verification.
• Unforgeability: Only valid group members are able to
signcrypt a message on behalf of the group.
• Confidentiality: No one can recover the signcrypted
message, except for either the receiver or the members
belonging to the receiving group.
• Sender’s Anonymity: Identifying the sender of a valid
unsigncrypted message is computationally hard for any-
one except the group manager.
• Ciphertext Anonymity: The ciphertext reveals no
information about who created it nor about whom it is
intended to, i.e., the sender’s identity is hidden not only
to an outsider but also to the receiver.
• Unlinkability:No one can tell if two signcryptions were
from the same signer or not.
• Traceability: The group manager can find the true
signer, for any valid verified message.
• Exculpability: No one, even the group manager, can
signcrypt on the behalf of other group members.
• Coalition-resistance: A colluding subset of group
members cannot generate valid signcryptions in such a
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way that the group manager is unable to link to one of
the colluding group members.
• Unforgeable tracing verification: The group manager
cannot falsely accuse a signer of creating signcryptions
he/she did not create.
We refer to [15], [45] for more details.
B. SECURITY MODEL
We mainly focus on sUF, IND and ANON proofs since
it is known that the notion of security for a signcryption
protocol combines unforgeability of the signature and indis-
tinguishability of the encryption scheme [28], [37], [39],
[45]. Moreover, the notion of ciphertext anonymity [45] is
also considered since it is an important privacy-enhancing
property characterizing our proposal.
1) STRONG EXISTENTIAL UNFORGEABILITY (sUF)
We consider the notion of Strong Existential Unforgeabil-
ity under adaptive Chosen Message Attack (sUF-CMA) [9],
[45]. In an asymmetric settings, the sender and the receiver
do not share the same secret key, therefore, the system needs
to be protected not only from an outsider but also from an
insider. In case of sUF-CMA, the attacker is given the private
key of the receiver [45]. This proves that a receiver cannot
forge a signcryption ciphertext that should be from the sender.
Therefore, sUF-CMA is defined by using the following
game between a Challenger C and an Adversary A:
Setup: C runs algorithms Setup and KeyGen to gener-
ate the public system security parameters par , sender’s
key pair (pks, sks) and receiver’s key pair (pkr , skr ).A is
given (par, pks, pkr , skr ).
Signcryption-Queries: A requests signcryption of at
most qs messages of its choice m1, . . . ,mqs ∈ {0, 1}
∗. C
responds to each query with a ciphertext and a signature
(ci, σi) ← Signcrypt(par, sks, pkr ,mi) (note that A
does not need to have access to an unsigncryption oracle
as it can compute the unsigncryption algorithm itself
using skr ).
Output:A eventually outputs a pair (c, σ ) and wins the
game if:
1. (1,m) ← Unsigncrypt (par, c, σ, pks, skr ) is a
valid signature.
2. (c, σ ) was not the output of a signcryption query
Signcrypt (par, sks, pkr ,mi) during the game.
We define AdvsUFA to be the probability that the adversary
A wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made
by A and C.
Definition 3: A forger A is said to (t, qs, ε)-break a sign-
cryption scheme if A runs in time at most t, A makes
at most qs signcryption queries and qs unsigncryption
queries, and AdvsUFA is at least ε. A signcryption scheme
is (t, qs, ε)-secure against strongly existentially unforgeable
under adaptive chosen message attack if there exists no forger
that (t, qs, ε)-breaks it.
Definition 3 follows Boneh proposal (see Definition 1
in [9]) and is modified to work in a signcryption environ-
ment [45]. Note that the proposed group signcryption pro-
tocol is based on wBB signature [9].
2) INDISTINGUISHABILITY (IND)
We consider the notion of INDistinguishability under adap-
tive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2) [41], [45]. In an
asymmetric settings, the sender and the receiver do not share
the same secret keys and, therefore, the system need to be
protected not only from an outsider but also from an insider.
In case of IND-CCA2, the private key of the sender is given to
the attacker [45]. In this way, it is proven that the signcryption
scheme protects the confidentiality of the messages even if
the sender’s secret key is leaked to an attacker.
IND-CCA2 is defined by using the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A:
Setup: C runs algorithms Setup and KeyGen to gener-
ates the public system security parameters par , sender’s
key pair (pks, sks) and receiver’s key pair (pkr , skr ).A is
given (par, pks, sks, pkr ).
Queries-1: A requests unsigncryption of at most qs′
ciphertexts c1, . . . , cqs′ , under pks and pkr . C responds
to each query with 1 and a signed message (1,mi) ←
Unsigncrypt (par, pks, skr , ci, σi) if the obtained
signed plaintext is valid and with 0 otherwise (note that
A does not need to have access to a signcryption oracle
as it can compute the signcyption algorithm using sks).
Challenge: A outputs two equal-length messages m′0
and m′1 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ on which it wishes to be chal-
lenged. Then, hidden from A view, C chooses b ←
{0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext (c′∗, σ∗)←
Signcrypt(par, sks, pkr ,m′b)
Queries-2: A may request at most qs′′ signcryption and
unsigncryption queries as in Queries-1 phase but with
the restriction that A cannot query for c′∗.
Guess: A produces its guess b′ of b. A is successful if
b′ = b, i.e., the guess is correct.
We define AdvINDA to be the probability that the adversary




Definition 4: An adversary A is said to (t, qs, µ,
m, ε)-break a signcryption scheme if A runs in time at most
t, A makes at most qs = qs′ + qs′′ signcryption queries and
qs unsigncryption queries, the size of the decryption queries
is at most µ bits, the size of the challenge messages m′0 and
m′1 is at most m bits, and Adv
IND
A is at least ε. A signcryption
scheme is (t, qs, µ,m, ε)-secure against indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if there exists no
adversary that (t, qs, µ,m, ε)-breaks it.
Definition 3 uses 1) the same notation proposed in [9]
for consistence purposes, 2) Smart indistinguishability def-
initions (see Section 3 in [41]), and 3) is slightly modi-
fied to work in a signcryption environment [45]. Note that
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the proposed group signcryption protocol is based on
Gayoso et al. encryption scheme [18] which was proven to
be secure by Smart [41].
3) CIPHERTEXT ANONYMITY (ANON)
We consider the notion of ciphertext ANONymity under
adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (ANON-CCA) [45]. This
property is satisfied if ciphertexts reveal no information about
who created them nor about whom they are intended to.
Therefore, the system needs to be protected from an outsider
and ANON-CCA is defined by using the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A:
Setup: C runs algorithms Setup and KeyGen to gener-
ates the public system security parameters par , sender’s
key pair (pks, sks), and two distinct receiver’s key pair
(pkr0 , skr0 ) and (pkr1 , skr1 ).A is given par , pkr0 and pkr1 .
Queries-1: A requests signcryption of at most qs′ mes-
sages of its choice m1, . . . ,mqs′ ∈ {0, 1}
∗ for the key
pairs (pkr0 , skr0 ) and (pkr1 , skr1 ). C responds to each
query with a ciphertext and a signature (cij , σi) ←
Signcrypt(par, sks, pkrj ,mi), where j = 0, 1. Then,
proceeding adaptively, A requests unsigncryption of at
most qs′ ciphertexts c1, . . . , cqs′ , under pks and pkrj
with j = 0, 1. C responds to each query with 1
and a signed message (1,mi) ← Unsigncrypt
(par, pks, skrj , cij , σi) if the obtained signed plaintext is
valid and with 0 otherwise.
Challenge: A eventually outputs two sender’s private
keys sks0 and sks1 , and a message m ∈ {0, 1}
∗ on which
it wishes to be challenged. Then, hidden from A view,
C chooses b, d ← {0, 1} and computes the challenge
ciphertext (c′∗, σ∗)← Signcrypt(par, sksb , pkrd ,m).
Queries-2: A may request at most qs′′ signcryption and
unsigncryption quieries as in Queries-1 phase but with
the restriction that A cannot query for (c′∗, pksj ), where
j = 0, 1.
Guess: A produces its guess b′ of b and d ′ of d . A is
successful if b′ = b and d = d ′, i.e. the guess is correct.
We define AdvANONA to be the probability that the
adversary A wins in the above game, and it is defined
as
AdvINDA = |4Pr[(b
′, d ′) = (b, d)]− 1|
Definition 5: An adversary A is said to (t, qs, µ,
m, ε)-break a signcryption scheme if A runs in time at most
t,Amakes at most qs = qs′+qs′′ signcryption queries and qs
unsigncryption queries, the size of the decryption queries is at
mostµ bits, the size of the challenge messages m′0 andm
′
1 is at
most m bits, and AdvANONA is at least ε. A signcryption scheme
is (t, qs, µ,m, ε)-secure against anonymity under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack if there exists no adversary that
(t, qs, µ,m, ε)-breaks it.
Definition 5 uses the same notation proposed in [9] for
consistence purposes and 3) is slightly modified to work in
a signcryption environment [45].
TABLE 3. Definition of the variables.
V. ARCHITECTURE
Three types of entities interact in our signcryption scheme: a
Sender Group Manager, a Sender, and a Receiver. Moreover,
a Receiver Group Manager is involved in the multi-receiver
scenario.
• Sender Group Manager (SGM), shortly Manager:
the Sender Group Manager generates system security
parameters and cryptographic keys, enrolls new senders
and traces malicious ones.
• Group Sender, shortly Sender: the Sender signcrypts
the data and sends them to the receiver.
• Receiver GroupManager (RGM): the Receiver Group
Manager generates group public and secret keys, enrolls
new receivers, and distributes the decryption keys
between them all. RGM is needed only in the multi-
receiver scenario.
• Receiver: the Receiver receives the signcrypted data,
and decrypts and checks the validity of the signature of
the plaintext.
Table 3 shows the main variables with their definition
used throughout the our scheme. The signcryption scheme
consists of the following five algorithms (which are sketched
in Figure 1):
• (par, (pks, skm), (pkr , skr )) ← Setup(1κ ): this algo-
rithm works in two phases. At first, on the input of
security parameter κ , the Manager generates and pub-
lishes the public system parameters par = (q,G1,G2,
GT , e, g, g2,H, SYM ), chooses and publishes the public
key shared by all senders pks, and chooses the manager’s
private key skm which is kept secret. In particular, H
is a predefined hash function and SYM is a predefined
secure symmetric encryption scheme. At second, on the
input of the public system parameters par , the Receiver
generates a secret key skr and publishes the receiver’s
public key pkr .
• (δi, rd)← Join(par, ski, skm): on the input of the pub-
lic system parameters par , the manager’s private key skm
and the sender’s secret key ski, this protocol outputs the
sender group member credential δi and the revocation
database rd . The Join algorithm is run as an interactive
protocol between the Manager and the Sender.
• (σ, c)← Signcrypt(par,m, ski, δi, pkr ): on the input
of the public system parameters par , the message m,
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FIGURE 1. Group signcryption scheme architecture.
the receiver’s public key pkr , the sender’s key ski and
the credential δi, the Signcrypt algorithm outputs the
signature σ on the message m, and the ciphertext c of m.
This algorithm is run by the Sender.
• (m, 0/1)← Unsigncrypt(par, skr , pks, c, σ ): on the
input of the public system parameters par , receiver’s
private key skr , the public key pks, the ciphertext c
and the signature σ , the Unsigncrypt algorithm
decrypts the ciphertext c and returns the messagem, then
verifies the signature σ and returns 1 and the message m
iff the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
This algorithm is run by the Receiver.
• (pki) ← Open(rd, σ ): on the input of the manager’s
revocation database rd and a signature σ , the algorithm
outputs the sender’s public key pki which is linkable
with sender’s identity. The Open algorithm is run by the
Manager.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES INTEGRATION
Weuse several cryptographic primitives in the following parts
of the scheme:
• Group signature (GS): It allows a signer to generate
anonymous signatures onmessages. In particular, we use
the lightweight group signature presented byHajny et al.
[19] which is based on the weak Boneh-Boyen (wBB)
signature [9].
• Encryption scheme: Integration of ECIES scheme [18]
allows us to establish a session key and encrypt the
signer’s data.
• Proofs of Knowledge (PK): Thanks to PK, the Sender
can prove the possession of its secret key and therefore
generate the group signature within the Signcrypt
algorithm. Furthermore, PK is also used to prove the
possession of secret keys of both Manager and Sender
within the Join phase. To do so, we use the Schnorr
protocol [42].
• Homomorphic encryption (HE): We use the Paillier
encryption scheme [36] to securely compute the group
sender credential as shown in [7]. HE is run in the
Join phase between the Manager and the Sender. HE
ensures that no secret values of both parties, which are
needed for forging the sender credential, are shown to
the counterparty.
• Group key agreement (GKA): The BCEP group key
agreement protocol [11] is used in the Join phase to
generate and distribute the decryption key in the receiver
group. This protocol is applied in the multi-receiver
scenario.
VI. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, our group-to-one signcryption scheme is
presented in detail. This scheme allows any sender from a
group to signcrypt a message in the group’s behalf and send
it to one receiver. Regarding the group signature scheme,
we slightly modify the original group signature scheme pro-
posed by Hajny et al. [19]. In our variant, we employ the
Paillier encryption [36] to provide exculpability property as
shown by Belenkiy et al. [7]. This property was not provided
in the original scheme and guarantees that the group manager
cannot sign on the behalf of other group members. Moreover,
the group signature scheme [19] uses Weak Boneh-Boyen
signature [9] and its efficient proof of knowledge [13] to
sign messages. The wBB signatures were proven to be exis-
tentially unforgeable against a weak (non-adaptive) chosen
message attack under the p-SDH assumption [9]. For the
encryption, we take inspiration from the ECIES scheme pro-
posed by Gayoso et al. [18]. In our proposal, a Key Deriva-
tion Function (KDF) is needed. In particular, KDF is defined
as KDF : Zq × Zq → {0, 1}λ, where λ is the bitlength of a
SYM key. The concrete algorithms can be found below.
A. SETUP ALGORITHM
The Setup algorithm consists of two phases:
Setup_SGM: The Manager performs the following steps:
1) Choose a bilinear map e : G1 ×G2→ GT , where G1,
G2, and GT are groups of the same prime order q, g a
generator of G1, and g2 a generator of G2.
2) Define a secure hash function H : G1 × G1 × G1 ×
G1 × {0, 1}|m| → Zq, where |m| is the length of the
plaintext message.
3) Choose a symmetric encryption scheme SYM =
(EncSYM ,DecSYM ).
4) Choose skm ←$ Zq as the manager’s private key, and
set pks = g
skm
2 as the sender’s group public key.
5) Generate an RSA-modulus n of size at least 23κq2,
where κ is a security parameter. Furthermore, let h =
n+ 1 and g be an element of the order φ(n) mod n2.
6) For simplicity of this exposition, we assume the exis-
tence of an RSAmodulus n such that neither the Sender
nor theManager knows its factors. This modulus can be
provided by a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Alternatively,
the Sender and the Manager can generate their own
modules and use them in the protocol as proposed
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FIGURE 2. CS notation of the Join algorithm.
in [4]. Furthermore, let h and g be two elements in Z∗n
such that logg h is unknown and g ∈ 〈h〉.
7) Publish the public system security parameters par =
(pks, q,G1,G2,GT , e, g, g2,H, SYM ,n,h,g, n, g, h)
and keep (skm, φ(n)) secret.
Setup_R: This algorithm is run by the Receiver. With
public system parameters par , the Receiver performs the
following steps:
1) Randomly choose a private key skr ←$ Zq.
2) Compute and publish its public key pkr = gskr .
B. JOIN ALGORITHM
This algorithm is run by the Sender and theManager. Figure 2
shows the Join algorithm in Camenisch and Stadler (CS)
notation, where the secure two-party computation of the
Sender i credential δi takes place.
This algorithm allows computing δi = g1/(skm+ski) without
that the Manager reveals it private key skm and the Sender its
secret key ski. With public system security parameters par ,
Manager’s secret key skm and Sender’s secret key ski as input,
the Manager and the Sender perform the following steps (see
in Appendix E.4 of [7] for more details):
1) the Manager computes
e1 = hn/2+skmgr mod n2,




where r ′←$ Zφ(n), and sends (e1, c) to the Sender,
2) the Manager and the Sender run the following PK
protocol with each other:
PK {(skm, r, r ′) : e1/hn/2 = hskmgr mod n2
∧ c = gskmhr
′
mod n}
3) the Sender chooses r1 ←$ Zq and r2 ←$ {0, . . . , 2κq},
computes
e2 = (e1/hn/2)r1h(n/2+ski)r1+r2qgr̄ mod n2
and the commitment
c′ = gskihr̄ mod n,
with r̄ ←$ [0, n2κ ], his/her public key pki = g
ski
2 , and
sends (e2, pki, c′) to the Manager,
4) the Manager and the Sender run the following protocol
with each other:
PK {(ski, r1, r2, sk ′i , u, r̄) :
e2/hn/2 = (e1/hn/2)r1hsk
′
i (hq)r2gr̄ mod n2






where sk ′i = skir1 and u = −r̄r1.
5) The Manager decrypts x = Dec(e2) − n/2, computes
σ ∗ = g1/x and sends it to the sender.
6) The sender computes δi = (σ ∗)r1 and verifies that it is




With the public system security parameters par , the message
m, the receiver’s public key pkr , the sender’s secret key ski
and the credential δi, the Sender i generates the ciphertext c
and the signature σ of m as follows:
1) Randomly choose randomizers r, ρr , ρski ←
$ Zq, and
compute g′ = gr and j = pkrr .
2) Generate a symmetric key kenc = KDF(j).
3) Encrypt the message c = EncSYM (m, kenc) by the
symmetric encryption scheme.











e = H(g′, δ′i, δ̄i, t,m), sr = ρr − er , and sski =
ρski − eski necessary to generate the signature proof of





5) Send (σ, c) to the Receiver, where σ = (g′, δ′i, δ̄i, π).
D. UNSIGNCRYPT ALGORITHM
When receiving (σ, c), the Receiver decrypts the message
and, then, verifies the signature as follows:
1) DECRYPT
1) Compute j′ = g′skr and k ′enc = KDF(j
′).
2) Recover the message m = DecSYM (c, k ′enc).
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FIGURE 3. Full notation of Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms.
2) VERIFY




sr , and checks if the







The full notation of the Signcrypt and the
Unsigncrypt algorithms is depicted in Figure 3.
E. OPENING ALGORITHM
This algorithm allows the Manager to open the signature
and track the Signer. With the manager’s revocation database
rd and the signature σ , the Manager checks if the equation
e(δ′, pkj)
?
= e(δ̄i, g2) holds for any of pkj in its database,
where j in {0, . . . n} and n is the number of sender group
members. If there exists an pkj for which this equation holds,
pkj is linked with the sender’s real identity.
F. REVOKE ALGORITHM
Our scheme is compatible with standard revocation algo-
rithms for randomized proofs, see [13] for more details.
VII. MULTI-RECEIVER SCENARIO
The proposed signcryption scheme can be easily adapted
to a multi-receiver scenario. A sketch of the multi-receiver
scenario is depicted in Figure 4. In this case, the Sender
signcrypts the message and sends it to a group of receivers
instead of one receiver. Therefore, we need to create a group
of authorized receivers and a way to securely distribute the
group secret key (unsigncryption key) to all group members.
FIGURE 4. Multi-receiver group signcryption scenario.
To do so, we adopt the solution of Kwak et al. [23] which
involves the BCEP [11] protocol to distribute the unsigncryp-
tion key to the targeted group of receivers.
In particular, Setup_SGM, Join, Signcrypt,
Unsigncrypt, and Open algorithms remain unchanged.
In fact, these algorithms either belong to the group of senders
or receive the same input as in the group-to-one scenario.
On the contrary, the group of receivers requires the addition
of Setup-RGM and Join-R algorithms to Setup and
Join algorithms, respectively. The main task of these new
protocols is to distribute the group secret key between the
members of the receiver group.
The concrete algorithms of our multi-receiver scheme can
be found below.
A. SETUP ALGORITHM
The Setup algorithm consists of two phases:
Setup_SGM: This algorithm is run by the Manager. The
algorithm is equal to Algorithm Setup_SGM in Section VI.
Setup_RGM: RGM performs the following steps:
• on the input of the system public parameters par , RGM
chooses random x ←$ Zq and computes y = gx ,
• then computes skG = H(IV , y), where IV is an initial
vector. The value x is the manager’s secret key, skG is the
group secret key, while pkG = gskG is the group public
key.
B. JOIN_S ALGORITHM
This algorithm is equal to Algorithm Join in Section VI.
C. JOIN_R ALGORITHM
A Receiver belonging to the authorized group computes yi =
gxi , where xi ←$ Zq. Then it sends yi and the signature σi
on yi to RGM. Note that σi is generated by a secure signature
scheme such as either RSAor Elliptic CurveDigital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). If the Receiver belongs also to the
sender group, and if it is permitted by the system, then the
Receiver can signcrypt the value yi and send it to RGM.
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The RGM checks whether the signature is valid or not. If it
is valid, then RGM computes the member’s key αi = yxi and
regenerates the group secret key skG = H(IV , y, α1, · · ·αn),
where n is the number of group members. The RGM sends
(skGi, IV , y, σRGM ) to all members, where skGi = skG ⊕
H(IV , αi) and σRGM is a signature on the triplet (skGi, IV , y).
Each group member then can verify the signature σRGM ,
computeαi = yxi and recover the shared group secret key skG.
In this way, the RGM can securely share the group secret key
skG with all group members, while the pkG = gskG is made
public.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that the proposed scheme satisfies all
group signcryption security features listed in Section IV-A.
Firstly, we focus on proving that our scheme satis-
fies correctness, confidentiality (IND-CCA2), unforgeability
(sUF-CMA) and ciphertext anonymity (ANON-CCA). These
are the main features of any signcryption protocol as shown
in [45]. Then we remark that our group signcryption scheme
also guarantees sender anonymity, unlinkability, traceability,
and coalition-resistance. Finally, we show that our scheme
provides exculpability and unforgeable tracing verification
properties.
A. CORRECTNESS
Theorem 1: The decryption process in Section VI-D is
correct.
Proof: Since a symmetric cryptographic scheme is used
to encrypt the message, at first we show that the receiver can
reconstruct the sender’s key. In fact,
j′ = g′skr = (gr )skr = pkrr = (g
skr )r = j
k ′enc = KDF(j
′) = KDF(j) = kenc
and, therefore, DecSYM (c, k ′enc) = DecSYM (c, kenc) = m.
Accordingly, the decryption process is correct.
Theorem 2: The verification process in Section VI-D is
correct.
Proof: See Appendix A for proof.
B. STRONG EXISTENTIAL UNFORGEABILITY (sUF)
Boneh and Boyen [9] prove that the wBB signature scheme
is strong existentially unforgeable against an adaptive chosen
message attack under the p-SDH assumption. The sUF-CMA
of our scheme follows from the unforgeability of wBB signa-
ture (see Lemma 9 in [9]) and uses the same proof technique.
We consider an attacker who makes up to qs adaptive sign-
cryption and unsigncryption queries, and reduce the forgery
to the resolution of a random p-SDH instance for p = qs.
Theorem 3: Suppose the (p, t ′, ε)-SDH assumption holds
in (G1,G2). Then the signcryption scheme proposed in
Section VI is (t, qs, ε)-secure against existential forgery
under adaptive chosen message attack with
qs ≤ p and t ≤ t ′ −2(pT )
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation inG1,G2
and Zq.
Proof: See Appendix B for proof.
C. INDISTINGUISHABILITY (IND)
Smart [41] analyzes the security of a generic ECIES scheme,
in particular, he focuses on the indistinguishability under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. The IND-CCA2 of our
scheme follows the same proof technique of ECIES indistin-
guishability (see Section 4 in [41]). We consider an attacker
whomakes up to qs adaptive signcryption and unsigncryption
queries.
Lemma 4: For any adversary A running in time t and
making at most qs = qs′ + qs′′ unsigncryption queries, the
advantage of winning the IND-CCA2 game is
AdvINDA (t, qs) ≤ 2Adv
DDH
B (t






′, q) is the maximal probability of solving the
DDH assumption in time t ′.
- AdvSDHB (t
′′, p) is the maximal probability of solving the
SDH assumption in time t ′′.
- AdvSYMB (t
′′′, |κ|) = 2Pr[b′ = b] − 1 is the maximal
advantage of any adversary mounting a chosen plaintext
attack on SYM in time t ′′′ with key size |κ|.
Proof: See Appendix C for proof.
Theorem 5: Suppose the (q, t ′, ε′)-DDH and (p, t ′′,
ε′′)-SDH assumptions hold in G1 and (G1,G2), respectively.
Then the signcryption scheme proposed in Section VI is
(t, qs, ε)-secure against indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attacks with




where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation inG1,G2
and Zq.
Proof: We prove this theorem using Lemma 4 which
allows bounding the advantage of winning the IND-CCA2
game. Since AdvDDHB =
q2s
p , where qs is the number of queries
that A makes (as proven by Shoup [43], Theorem 4), the
claimed bound is obvious by construction.
It is important to notice that our proof theoretically works
for any SYM and KDF schemes which are separately proven
to be secure. In fact, the security of our sygncryption scheme
relies on the security of chosen SYM and KDF schemes.
For instance, Smart [41] suggests using SHA-1 as the KDF
function.
D. CIPHERTEXT ANONYMITY (ANON)
Ciphertext anonymity property is satisfied if ciphertexts
reveal no information about who created them nor about
whom they are intended to [45]. In particular, this exactly
covers that sender’s and receiver’s identities are hidden to
outsiders.
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We consider an attacker who makes up to qs adaptive
signcryption and unsigncryption queries.
Lemma 6: For any adversaryA running in time t andmak-
ing at most qs = qs′ + qs′′ signcryption and unsigncryption
queries, the advantage of winning the ANON-CCA game is
AdvANONA (t, qs) ≤ 4Adv
DDH
B (t







′, q), AdvSDHB (t
′′, p) and AdvSYMB (t
′′′, |κ|) are
defined as in Lemma 4.
Proof: See Appendix D for proof.
Theorem 7: Suppose the (q, t ′, ε′)-DDH and (p, t ′′,
ε′′)-SDH assumptions hold in G1 and (G1,G2), respectively.
Then the signcryption scheme proposed in Section VI is
(t, qs, ε)-secure against anonymity under adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks with







where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation inG1,G2
and Zq.
Proof: We prove this theorem using Lemma 6 which
allows bounding the advantage of winning the ANON-CCA
game. Since AdvDDHB =
q2s
p , where qs is the number of queries
that A makes (as proven by Shoup [43], Theorem 4), the
claimed bound is obvious by construction.
E. SENDER’S ANONYMITY, UNLINKABILITY,
TRACEABILITY, AND COALITION-RESISTANCE
It is important to notice that sender’s anonymity, unlinkability,
traceability, and coalition-resistance are privacy-enhancing
features achieved thanks to the usage of our previously
proposed group signature [19].
This group signature is integrated with the zero-knowledge
proofs, i.e., the Sender i proves the knowledge of its secret key
ski and the credential δi. In particular, without the knowledge
of the secret key ski and a randomizer r , these proofs are
provably unlinkable. Moreover, traceability is guaranteed
since the Manager knows the senders’ public keys pkj =
g
−skj
2 , for j ∈ {1, . . . n} where n is the number of senders.
Therefore, the Manager is able to efficiently link all proofs
by computing e(δ′i, pkj)
?
= e(δ̄i, g2). Regarding sender’s
anonymity, any sender can sign the message on behalf of
a group, therefore, its identity is hidden inside the group.
In order to break the coalition-resistance property, a subset
of senders needs to generate a new valid group sender cre-
dential δi = g1/(skm+new) for a secret key new without the
knowledge of Manager secret key skm and with new different
from ski for any Sender i in the colluding group. This is
equivalent to solve p-SDH problem.We refer to [13] for more
details.
F. EXCULPABILITY AND UNFORGEABLE TRACING
VERIFICATION
The exculpability is guaranteed by NIZKPK scheme [7].
The NIZKPK allows to generate the secret group member
credential δi = g1/(skm+ski) for a Sender i without disclosing
the sender’s secret key ski and its credential δi. In particular,
without the knowledge of ski and δi, no one, neither the
Manager, can generate signcrypted messages on the behalf
of any Sender i. In case of unforgeable tracing verification,
Opening algorithm guarantees that the Manager cannot
falsely accuse a signer of creating signcryption that it did
not create. On the input of the signer’s proof (δ′i, δ̄i), public
system parameter g2, and sender’s public key fromManager’s
revocation database pkj ← rd , everyone can verify whether





In this section, we present two use cases: (A) deduplica-
tion of big data in cloud computing and (B) anonymous
statistical survey of attributes. Note that our many-to-one
group signcryption scheme is suitable for Use case (A) while
our multi-receiver group signature for Use case (B). See
Sections VI and VII, respectively, for more details.
A. DEDUPLICATION OF BIG DATA IN CLOUD COMPUTING
The cloud is fast becoming a suitable strategy in the big
data context. The 2021 State of the Cloud Survey [17] esti-
mated that 92 percent of enterprises had either a multi-cloud
strategy or a hybrid strategy. Data deduplication is a process
that allows controlling the growth of data on the cloud by
eliminating duplicate copies. Cho and Toshiba [15] propose a
verifiable hash convergent group signcryption which requires
the involvement of a group signcryption scheme in the data
deduplication process. In their proposal, a group of users is
able to eliminate redundant encrypted data owned by different
users.
Our scheme can be also adapted to work in this sce-
nario and allows any user to anonymously upload and down-
load encrypted data. Whereas Cho and Toshiba consid-
ered a multi-receiver signcryption scheme, we think that a
many-to-one group signcryption (presented in Section VI)
is more suitable for this application. Our scheme needs the
involvement of a Hash Convergent Encryption (HCE). HCE
allows data encrypted by different users to generate the same
ciphertext. We consider Bellare-Keelveedhi-Ristenpart HCE
algorithm [8] following Cho and Toshiba proposal [15]. In an
HCE, the message is encrypted with a message-derived key k .
This key is the hash of the message m and a public parameter
p. The message m is then encrypted γ = Enc(p, k,m) and a
tag is created from a tag generation algorithm t = T (γ ). The
tag is used to check whether the deduplicated file is fake or
not. The message m can be recovered through the decryption
process m = Dec(k, c).
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The participants of this system are the Group Manager,
the User, and the Server. Note that the Group Manager, the
User, and the Server take the role of the Manager, the Group
Sender, and the Receiver in our scheme. In this case, the
Server can verify the users’ ownership of the ciphertext,
i.e. it can partially unsigncrypt the ciphertext.
• Setup: the Group Manager of group Ga initiates
Seput_SGM algorithm and establishes the public
parameters par , the group public key pks, and its secret
key skm. Then the Server initiates Seput_R and estab-
lishes its public pkr and secret skr keys. See Section VI
for more details.
• Join: the User i with the Group Manager runs Join_S
algorithm to join group Ga.
• Upload protocol: given a file f , the User i runs HCE
scheme which generates a ciphertext γ and a tag t =
T (γ ). On the input message γ , the User i runs the
Signcrypt algorithm that outputs a ciphertext c and a
signature σ . The user then uploads (c, t, σ ) to the Server
which checks the validity of the file and the signature
by running the Unsigncrypt protocol and, if σ and t
are valid, obtains the ciphertext γ . If γ is already stored
in the cloud, it adds σ to the existing file, otherwise it
stores (γ, t, σ ).
• Download protocol: when the User iwants to download
ciphertext γ from the Server, it sends a download request
to the Server. The request consists in the file name, σ and
t . The Server checks the validity and ownership of the
file and if the verification is valid, return γ to the User i
which decrypts it and recover the file f .
Due to the confidentiality, anonymity, and unlinkability of the
group signcryption scheme, the Server obtains no information
beyond the stored ciphertext γ .
B. ANONYMOUS STATISTICAL SURVEY OF ATTRIBUTES
A group signcryption protocol is a suitable candidate to
perform an anonymous statistical survey of attributes [23].
In this kind of surveys [34], [35], a service provider wants to
collect users’ personal information attributes such as gender,
age, and job. In particular, the service provider has interest
in running statistics on these sensitive data for marketing
purposes. On the other hand, users desire to use the service
anonymously. In fact, disclosing their personal information
may enable the service provider to recover their identity.
The participants in this system are an attribute authority,
users, a service provider and trustees. It is assumed that the
attribute authority is a TTP that can assure the validity of
the users’ encrypted attributes. Note that the attribute author-
ity, users, and trustees are respectively SGM, Senders, and
Receivers in our group signcryption scheme. Therefore, the
survey runs as follows:
• Setup: the parameters of the group signcryption scheme
are set up through the Setup algorithm of Section VII
by the attribute authority.
• Registration: to join the system, a user conducts the
Join_S protocol with the attribute authority, where the
TABLE 4. Complexity comparison of current group signcryption schemes
(Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms).
user joins the group based on a corresponding attribute
value. Then the trustees run the Join_R algorithm.
• Offer: during the service, the user sends their sign-
crypted attribute (i.e., its encrypted group ID) to the
service provider for decryption by a certain trustee. The
Sincrypt algorithm is used in this step. Users select
one trustee and warn the service provider with which
trustee is designated.
• Generate: the service provider gives the trustees the
collected signcryptions. The trustees decrypt the cipher-
texts to reveal the group IDs and then verify the signa-
tures. The revealed groups indicate the statistics of the
attributes. The Unsincrypt algorithm is used in this
step.
Due to the confidentiality, anonymity, and unlinkability of
the group signcryption scheme, the service provider obtains
no information beyond the statistics. The correctness of the
statistics is guaranteed by the unforgeability of the scheme.
X. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our scheme
with Kwak et al. proposal [23]. As shown in Tables 1 and 2,
Kwak et al. scheme is the only provable-secure scheme in
addition to our achieving sender and ciphertext anonymity.
In Table 4, the number of exponentiations and pairings are
depicted. Our scheme is more efficient than Kwak’s scheme
since their scheme performs ca. 3× more exponentiations
than our scheme. This is due to the fact that Kwak’s scheme
is 1) based on the sign-then-encrypt approach, and 2) the
underlying operations are run over RSA group, which is
significantly larger than the EC group. Furthermore, the RSA
construction of Kwak’s scheme is less efficient and less prac-
tical on constrained devices in the IoT environment. These
devices have limited memory and computational power, and
therefore, multiplicative groups, such as RSA, are practically
ineffective on these devices. On the contrary, the additive
groups over elliptic curves are currently dominant. In fact,
many of these constrained devices support only 3072-bit
RSA which is equivalently strong to 256-bit EC while others
do not support RSA at all. In contrast to Kwak’s scheme,
our scheme requires two operations of bilinear pairing in
Unsigncrypt protocol. However, considering the higher
computational power of the Receiver, the impact on efficiency
is minimal, see Section XI for more details.
XI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section provides the whole protocol implementation
and the implementation aspects discussion. Current IoT net-
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TABLE 5. Technical specification of tested smart cards.
TABLE 6. Cryptographic support on tested smart cards.
works consist of many resource-constrained devices with
limited computational and storage capabilities. In order to
cover the vast majority of possible use cases, we decided
to employ these devices in our testing scenario. The main
purpose is to demonstrate the efficiency and the practi-
cal potential of our scheme. In particular, we consider
ARM-platform (Raspberry Pi) and smart card platforms
(Java Card & MultOS). Their specifications are described
in Sections XI-A and XI-B, while the testing scenario and
evaluations are presented in Section XI-C.
A. SMART CARD SELECTION
Smart cards (SCs) are closed platforms. This means that it
is not usually possible to upgrade cryptographic libraries
on the card. SC cryptographic support differs according
to: 1) the SC platform (e.g., Java Card, MultOS and Basic
Card), 2) the version of the operating system, and 3) the SC
implementation itself.
For our tests, the newest cards in the market (for each card
platform one representative) were selected and their HW/SW
properties and cryptographic support were compared. The
technical specification of tested SCs is shown in Table 5.
Current SCs usually have only 8-bit, 16-bit (or 32-bit in really
special cases) processors, and small Random Access Mem-
ory (RAM) and Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-
Only Memory (EEPROM). These limited resources make the
development of novel cryptographic protocols very difficult.
On the other hand, SCs are equipped with a co-processor,
which allows developers to accelerate specific cryptographic
operations and algorithms.
FIGURE 5. Efficiency of ecMul operation on different smart card
platforms.
Note that our proposal requires 1) a symmetric encryption
algorithm to encrypt data, and 2) algebraic operations over
finite field and a secure hash algorithm to generate a signa-
ture. These simple requirements are not of easy support for
current SCs. The cryptographic support in accordance with
our signcryption scheme requirements is shown in Table 6.
It is important to note that there is no one smart card platform
that supports bilinear pairing operations nowadays. In partic-
ular, MultOS and Basic Cards are the only platforms which
allow accessing to modular and elliptic curve operations.
EC support and speed are crucial for our implementation,
and therefore we compared the speed of individual SC plat-
forms. Figure 5 depicts the EC scalar multiplication ecMul
(which is the most computationally demanding operation of
Signcrypt protocol) cost for Brainpool curves for different
elliptic curve sizes. MultOS (ML4) card is 75% faster than
Basic card (ZC7.6) and 35% faster than the fastest Java Card
(J3D081). Sm@rtCafe implementation shows a bit worse
results than JCOP SC implementation.
Furthermore, we also provided benchmarks of the
employed cryptographic algorithms. The SHA-1 algorithm
is used for creating non-interactive proof of knowledge
(signing part) and as a part of the key derivation function
KDF for key establishment (encryption part). We use Triple
Data Encryption Standard (3DES) algorithm to provide data
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TABLE 7. Technical specification of tested Raspberry Pi devices.
confidentiality. The reason for this choice is the missing sup-
port of a more secure Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm on MultOS cards. Figure 6 shows the speed of
SHA-1 and 3DES algorithms across platforms. The Java
Card reports a bit better results than MultOS cards. However,
we can assume that our data will not exceed 200 B, and there-
fore the difference between SCs is minimal (except for the
ML3 card, which reports much worse results in encryption),
i.e. around 20 ms for SHA-1 and 40 ms for 3DES.
B. ARM PLATFORM AND SOFTWARE SELECTION
ARM processors are widely used in smartphone, tablet,
smartwatch and other IoT mobile devices. Raspberry Pi is
an ARM-based single-board computer that runs Linux and
has various communication interfaces, e.g., General Purpose
Input/Output (GPIO) pins, Ethernet, HDMI, USB ports and
Bluetooth and WiFi adapters. These features allow a Rasp-
berry Pi to be a part of many services in the IoT ecosystems.
The technical specification of tested Raspberry Pi devices is
shown in Table 7.
In public repositories, e.g., GitHub, there are several
libraries with pairing-based cryptography support. The
choice of the cryptographic library is crucial during the appli-
cation development on resource-constrained devices. Since
we are interested in the best performance, and therefore, the
fastest pairing calculation, we focused on libraries imple-
mented in C/C++ programming language. The selected
libraries (Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) [29], Mul-
tiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic Cryptographic
Library (MIRACL) [31], University of Tsukuba Elliptic
Curve and Pairing Library (TEPLA) [21], Efficient LIbrary
for Cryptography (RELIC) [1] and MCL [40]) were installed
on an embedded device, i.e., ARM-based microcomputer
(Raspberry Pi 3Model B). The benchmarks were run by using
the 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig (BN) paring-friendly curve and
averaged over 10-runs. The results are presented in Figure 7.
We choose the MCL library, since it has support for the ARM
architecture (32-bit and also 64-bit version) and has the best
computational speed results among the compared libraries.
Furthermore, Table 8 shows the comparison of the most
time consuming operations for our protocol which are per-
formed on the tested ARM devices.
TABLE 8. Computational capability of tested ARM devices for most
demanding operations of our scheme.
C. TESTING SCENARIO AND SYSTEM PARAMETERS
In our testing scenario, receivers are represented by Rasp-
berry Pi devices, and senders by SCs or Raspberry Pi devices.
Normally, senders are represented by very resource-restricted
devices (i.e., with processing and memory restrictions). For
instance, a sender can be a user who owns a smartphone,
a smart meter, an on-board unit built in cars (each of these
devices can be represented by Raspberry Pis which are using
the same ARM processors) or an access card (which is a
SC). Accordingly, we choose a smart card platform that fol-
lows these constrained assumptions. Furthermore, the SC is a
tamper-resistant device which securely allows the storage and
the processing of sensitive data such as cryptographic keys.
In case of SC application development, we use only standard
MultOS Application Programming Interface (API) and free
public development environment (Eclipse IDE for C/C++
Developers, SmartDeck 3.0.1, MUtil 2.8). The application is
written in MultOS assembly code and C language.
Conversely, receivers can be servers, PCs, or embed-
ded devices that are less constrained and, therefore, can
be represented by a more powerful device. Tested SCs
and Raspberry Pi hardware and software specifications are
depicted in Tables 5 and 7, respectively. The Raspberries run
Raspbian 9.0.3 operating system and C/C++ application.
The application provides the communication with sender’s
smart card through Personal Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC)
interface and executes Unsigncrypt (and Signcrypt)
protocols. We use OpenSSL 1.1.1c library to perform
cryptographic operations (i.e., hash and cipher), and
MCL [40] library to perform operations over elliptic curves
(i.e., EC point addition, EC scalar point multiplication and
bilinear pairing). The application for Raspberry Pi was devel-
oped in NetBeans IDE 8.2 development environment. The
code was remotely built and executed on the targeted devices,
i.e. Raspberry Pi B+/ZeroW/3B+/4B.
The signcryption scheme implementation follows the
restrictions of current smart cards (see Table 6), and the
most recent security requirements defined by National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST), see [5] and [6]
for more details. The security level of our implementation
is 112 bits. This restriction is due to the use of the 3DES
cipher algorithm since the more secure AES-128 algorithm is
not supported by our MultOS smart card. However, replacing
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FIGURE 6. Message digest based on hash function SHA-1 and 3DES encryption on different smart card platforms.
FIGURE 7. The comparison of different cryptographic libraries from the
point of view of bilinear pairing performance over BN 256-bit elliptic
curve on the ARMv8 processor (the Raspberry Pi 3, 32-bit and 64-bit OS).
3DES with AES-128 algorithm directly increases the scheme
security to 128 bits, since our signcryption scheme already
uses 256-bits elliptic curves with embedding degree 12
(i.e. Barreto–Naehrig curve) and SHA-1 hash algorithm.
Table 9 shows the system parameters set in details.
Our implementation considers only the single-receiver
(i.e., many-to-one) scenario with messages of 64 bites
(8 bytes), where MultOS card acts as a Sender and Rasp-
berry Pi acts as both a Sender and a Receiver. A sketch
of our implementation with the involved smart card is
depicted in Figure 8. MultOS ML4 smart card supports
only T=0 transport protocol. Since we need to trans-
fer 299 bytes in total and T=0 protocol allows us to trans-
fer data payload of a maximum of 255 bytes, we need to
FIGURE 8. Implementation of Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms.
use two Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) commands
(GET SIGNCRYPT 1 and GET SIGNCRYPT 2). While
GET SIGNCRYPT 1 performs group signature generation,
GET SIGNCRYPT 2 derives encryption key and encrypts
data.
Figures 9 and 10 show the final computational times for
Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algoritms performed on
Raspberries and the MultOS card. In case of Raspberries, the
times are negligible and under 200 ms for both Signcrypt
and Unsigncrypt protocols. In case of Raspberry Pi 4, the
whole signcryption process takes less than 60 ms (without
communication overhead). Generally, SCs are much slower
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TABLE 9. Cryptographic algorithms and elliptic curve domain parameters.
FIGURE 9. The performance comparison of Signcrypt algorithm
performed on devices with different computing power.
FIGURE 10. The performance comparison of Unsigncrypt algorithm
performed on devices with different computing power.
to process Signcrypt algorithm compared to Raspberries.
However, in our implementation the SC is fast enough (under
1 s including communication overhead) to be used in a real
scenario.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we presented a new privacy-enhancing group
signcryption scheme that provides: unforgeability, confiden-
tiality, ciphertext and sender anonymity, traceability, unlink-
ability, exculpability, coalition-resistance, and unforgeable
tracing verification. The scheme is also compatible with
current revocation techniques such as [13]. This is achieved
by deploying our group signature scheme combined with an
elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme. Our scheme is
then extended to work in a multi-receiver scenario. In this
case, a group of senders can send a signcrypted message to a
group of receivers instead of only one receiver.
Moreover, the security analysis of the scheme is also
provided. Our proposal is proven to be strongly exis-
tentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message
attack, indistinguishable under an adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack, and to provide ciphertext anonymity under an adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack. The used signature has also
sender’s anonymity, traceability, unlinkability, and coalition-
resistance privacy features. Moreover, the integration of
NIZKPK in the key generation process (i.e., Join algorithm)
allows achieving exculpability and unforgeable tracing veri-
fication properties.
The experimental results show that our scheme is effi-
cient even on computationally restricted devices and can be
therefore used in many IoT applications. The Signcrypt
protocol on SCs takes less than 1 s (including communication
overhead). The Unsigncrypt protocol complexity time on
current ARM devices is negligible (less than 40 ms).
APPENDIX A
THEOREM 2 PROOF - CORRECTNESS
Once the message is correctly decrypted, we need to show
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Therefore, e = H(g′, δ′i, δ̄i, t,m) = H(g′, δ
′
i, δ̄i, t̂,m).




= e(δ′i, pks) holds. For a valid signature, we have
that
e(δ̄ig′, g2) = e(δ′i, pks)
e(δ−skiri g










skm+ski , g2) = e(δri , g
skm
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e(δi, g2)skmr = e(δi, g2)skmr .
Therefore, the correctness of the message and the signature
is proven.
APPENDIX B
THEOREM 3 PROOF - STRONG EXISTENTIAL
UNFORGEABILITY
We prove that if A can (t, qs, ε)-break the signcryption
scheme, then there exists an algorithm B such that, by inter-
acting with A, solves the p-SDH problem in time t ′
with advantage ε. Let (g, d1, d2, . . . , dp, g2, h) be a random
instance of the p-SDH problem in (G1,G2), where di = gx
i
∈
G1 for i = 1, . . . , p and h = gx2 ∈ G2 for some unkown
x ∈ Zq. Let g = d0 and x = skm for convenience. The goal
of B is to compute the pair (c, g1/(x+c)) ∈ Zq ×G1 for some
value c ∈ Zq r {x} of its choice.
B interacts with A as follows:
A. QUERY
A outputs a list of qs ≤ p messages m1, . . . ,mqs ∈ Zq.
We can suppose that qs = p for simplicity. If less queries
are made, we can always reduce the value of p to p′ = qs.
B. RESPONSE
B responds with p pairs
(ci, σi)← Signcrypt(par, sks, pkr ,mi)
and p ‘‘signed’’ messages
(mi, 0/1)← Unsigncrypt(par, pks, skr , ci, σi).
Therefore, A obtains p signature proofs of knowledge on
its input messages.
Let f be the univariate polynomial defined as f (X ) = X +
ski. B chooses θ ∈ Zq and computes
g1 = gθ f (x)
Therefore, A receives key ski, parameters p̂ar =
(q,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2,H, SYM ) and public key pks = h.
If f (x) = 0, then x = −ski and B can easily recover
the secret key x and solve the p-SDH problem. If f (x) 6=
0, then g1 and g2 are independently and uniformly dis-
tributed random generators for the respective groups due to
the action of φ. In this case, B has to apply both Signcrypt
and Unsigncrypt algorithms and generate a valid sig-
nature σj on each message mj, for j = 1, . . . , p. To do
so, by following Signcrypt algorithm, B chooses at ran-
dom r, ρr , ρski , encrypts mj and creates the signature: σj =
(g′, δ̄′i, δ
′
i, e, sr , sski ) where all the computations are made
using g1 instead of g. In fact, if g1 is used, then δi =
g1/f (x)1 = g
θ and B can compute each other component of the
signature easily. This is repeated for each message mj, where
j = 1, . . . , p.
Observe that σj is a valid signature on mj under p̂ar , since
e(δ̄′ig





= e(g−θskirf (x)/f (x)grθ f (x), g2)
= e(gθr(f (x)−ski), g2)
= e(gθrx , g2) = e(gθrx , g2)
= e(gθ f (x)r/f (x), gx2) = e(δ
′
i, pks)
The fact that e = H(g′, δ′i, δ̄i, t̂,mj) follows straightfor-
ward from the correctness of our scheme, see Theorem 2.
These are exactly the verification steps performed by B when
it applies Unsigncrypt algorithm and, therefore, links
each message mj to its signature σj. Since each message
admits only a unique signature proof of knowledge, the output
distribution is trivially correct.
C. OUTPUT
A returns for a user’s identity sk∗ a forgery (c∗, σ∗) such that
σ∗ is a valid signature and c∗ 6∈ {c1, . . . , cp}. The signature
σ∗ is a vector σ∗ = (g′, δ̄′i, δ
′
i, e, sr , sski ) computed using the
parameters p̂ar . We suppose that sk∗ 6= ski since A can
choose sk∗ knowing ski. By construction and uniqueness of






x+sk∗ where f (x) = x+ski. If x = −sk∗, thenB can
easily recover the secret key x and solve the p-SDH problem.
Otherwise, note that the polynomial f can be rewritten as
f (x) = x + sk∗ + γ∗ where γ∗ = ski − sk∗ ∈ Zq. Therefore,
the ratio f (x)/(x + sk∗) can be written as f (x)/(x + sk∗) =
1+ γ∗x+sk∗ and the expression of δ
∗ becomes
δ∗ = g
θ (1+ γ∗x+sk∗ )
Taking roots of order θ and γ∗ mod q, B can compute
ω = (δ1/θ∗ g
−θ )1/γ
∗
= g1/x+sk∗ ∈ G1 (1)
and obtain the pair (sk∗, ω) as the solution to the submitted
instance of the p-SDH problem.
The claimed bound is obvious by the construction of the
reduction.
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APPENDIX C
LEMMA 4 PROOF - INDISTINGUISHABILITY
We wish to use A to attack the security of the DDH prob-
lem, the underlying SYM and proposed group signature (GS)
schemes. During the proof the bitlength of the messages is
bounded by µ.
Game 1: Following the definition of IND-CCA2 game
(Section IV-B2), the below game is used to break the encryp-
tion scheme. C and A do as follows:
Setup: C runs algorithms Setup and KeyGen to gen-
erate the public system security parameters par , the
senders’ public key pks, the manager’s private key skm,
the sender’s i private key sks (:= ski) and the receiver’s
key pair (skr , pkr ). A is given (par, pks, sks, pkr ).
Queries-1: A requests unsigncryption of at most qs′
ciphertexts c1, . . . , cqs′ , under pks and pkr . C responds
to each query with 1 and a message (mi, 0/1) ←
Unsigncrypt(par, pks, skr , ci, πi) if the obtained
plaintext is valid and with 0 otherwise.
Challenge: A outputs two equal-length messages m′0
and m′1 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ on which it wishes to be challenged.
Then, hidden from A view, C chooses b ← {0, 1}




Queries-2: A may request at most qs′′ signcryption and
unsigncryption queries as in Queries-1 phase but with
the restriction that A cannot query for c′∗.
Guess: A produces its guess b′ of b. A is successful if
b′ = b, i.e. the guess is correct.
Therefore, AdvINDA (t, qs) = 2Pr[b
′
= b]− 1 represents the
probability that A wins in the above game in time t with at
most qs signcryption and unsigncryption queries.
Since A is not allowed querying the unsigncryption pro-
tocol for the target cipher c′∗, namely Type Q⊥ query, A
cannot have access to DecSYM for the key kenc corresponding
to c′∗. In case a Type Q⊥ query is made, DecSYM will output
γ ∈ {0, 1}. Let Type Qv be any valid query different from
Type Q⊥.
Game 2: In this game, we prove that if A can
(t, qs, µ,m, ε)-break the signcryption scheme, then there
exists an algorithm B such that, by interacting with A,
solves the DDH problem in time t ′ with advantage ε′. Let
〈g, ga, gb, gc〉 be a random instance of DDH problem in G2,
where a, b, c ∈ Zq. The goal is to determine whether c ≡ ab
mod q.
Therefore, Game 2 is the same as Game 1 but B has as
input the following values: (skr = b, pkr = gb), r = a, i.e.
g′ = ga, and j = gc (see Figure 3 for more details on the
protocol). In this way, kenc and k ′enc are equal if and only if
c ≡ ab mod q. In other words, A believes that c is equal to
ab mod q if A is successful in the game, i.e. b = b′.
We have three different situations depending on chosen
DDH problem instance and query type.
1) When a valid DDH problem instance is given as input,
A runs B as if one wants to mount an attack against the
proposed signcryption protocol. Therefore,
AdvDDHB (t
′, q) =
1+ AdvINDA (t, qs)
2
(2)
2) If a non-valid DDH problem instance is given as input
and A makes a Type Q⊥ query, A runs B as if one
wants to mount an attack against SYM . Therefore,
AdvDDHB [(t





where the inequality appears sinceBmakes 0 signcryp-
tion queries in order to break SYM .
3) If a non-valid DDH problem instance is given as
input and A makes a Type Qv query, the game is
the same of breaking GS and, therefore, breaking the
p-SDH problem. The proof follows straightforward
from the sUF-CMA (Theorem 3) of the signcryption
scheme. Indeed, the fact that kenc 6= k ′enc does not
affect the computation of σ ′∗ and Verify phase of





′, q) ∧ Type Qv] ≤ AdvSDHB (t
′′, p) (4)
where the inequality appears since B only requires one
round of signcryption and unsigncryption queries, i.e.
q′s ≤ qs signcryption and unsigncryption queries in
order to break GS.
Finally, combining Equations 2, 3 and 4, we obtain
AdvDDHB (t
′, q) ≥








and the claimed bound directly follows from the last
inequality.
APPENDIX D
LEMMA 6 PROOF - CIPHERTEXT ANONYMITY
The proof of this lemma follows the same structure of
Lemma 4. Since it would be redundant to rewrite the same
proof two times, we just sketch it emphasizing the main
difference.
As in Lemma 4, we wish to use A to attack the security
of DDH problem, the underlying SYM and the proposed GS
schemes. During the proof, the bitlength of the messages is
bounded by µ.
Game 1: In this case, we consider ANON-CCA game
(Section IV-B3), where
AdvANONA = |4Pr[(b
′, d ′) = (b, d)]− 1| (5)
is the probability that the adversaryA wins the ANON-CCA
game for our proposed signcryption scheme.
As above,A can do two different queries: Type Q⊥ query,
which is A querying for (c′∗, σ∗), and Type Qv query, that is
any valid query.
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Game 2: As above, if A can (t, qs, µ,m, ε)-break the
signcryption scheme, then there exists an algorithm B such
that, by interacting with A, solves the DDH problem in time
t ′ with advantage ε′. Let 〈g, ga, gb, gc〉 be a random instance
of DDH problem in G2, where a, b, c ∈ Zq. The goal is to
determine whether c ≡ ab mod q. As in Lemma 4, we have
three different situations, where only the first one is slightly
different from the previous proof:
1) When a valid DDH problem instance is given as input,
A runs B as if one wants to mount an attack against the
proposed signcryption protocol, therefore,
AdvDDHB (t
′, q) =
1+ AdvANONA (t, qs)
4
(6)
Observe that the denominator is 4, since this equality is
derived from Equation 5.
2) If a non-valid DDH problem instance is given as input
and A makes a Type Q⊥ query, we have Equation 3.
3) If a non-valid DDH problem instance is given as input
andAmakes a Type Qv query, the game is the same of
breaking GS and, therefore, we have Equation 4.
Finally, combining Equations 3, 4 and 6, we obtain the
claimed bound.
APPENDIX E
SECURITY ISSUES OF THE MOHANTY SCHEME [32]
Mohanty et al. [32] propose a signcryption scheme for secure
electronic cashes. The authors claim that their scheme is
secure such that neither the group manager nor any other
member of the group can produce a valid signcrypted text.
In this section, we show that the scheme presents secu-
rity flows, in particular, we prove that it does not provide
confidentiality, unforgeability, exculpability, and traceability
properties.
Four entities are involved in the protocol: a GroupManager
(GM), a Key Generation Center (KGC), users, and a verifier.
Let briefly summarize the protocol (see [32] formore details):
• Setup: The KGC chooses two large primes p and q,
a generator g of Zp and computes n = pq. Then KGC
sends n and g to GM.
• Key Generation_KGC: The KGC chooses its pri-
vate keyMsk , its identity IDKGC and computes its public
keyMpk = gMsk . ThenKGC sends (Mpk , IDKGC ) to GM.
• Key Generation_GM: The GM chooses V and
IDG and computes the group public and private key
(Gpbk ,Gprk ). Then GM publishes (n, g,Mpk , IDGM , e,
Gpbk ) and keeps private (d,V ,Gprk ), where ed ≡ 1
mod φ(n).
• Key Generation_User: A user chooses its private
parameter W and computes its public identity IDU =
IDWGM . The GM receives IDU which is used to generate
three values δ1, δ2, δ3 with δ3 = (IDGM )δ1·d These
values are sent back to the user.
• Signcryption: The user signcrypts message M on
behalf of the group. First the user chooses a private
parameter β ←$ Z∗n, then computes µ, key K and
ciphertext σ as follows:
µ = β + (δ3)e·δ
−1
1 mod n
K = H(µ · β) mod n
σ = (K ·M )+ Gpbk mod n
 = Gδ3pbk · (IDGM )
W mod n
1 = gδ3 mod n
2 = +
M
1 mod n (7)
Then the user sends the signcrypted text (µ, σ,,1,
2) to the verifier.
• Verification: In order to find a message M = M ′,
the verifier computes the following steps:
β ′ = (µ− IDGM ) mod n
K ′ = H(µ · β ′) mod n
M ′ = (µ− Gpbk ) · K ′−1 mod n (8)







• Opening: In case of any legal dispute the group man-




1 mod n (9)
D. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality is achieved if no one can recover the sign-
crypted message, except for the receiver. This requirement
does not holds since anyone can decrypt the message. The
decryption process (Equation 8) works as follows:
β ′ = (µ− IDGM ) mod n
K ′ = H(µ · β ′) mod n
M ′ = (µ− Gpbk ) · K ′−1 mod n
Note that IDGM , µ and Gpbk are public values and there-
fore, the decryption process can be run by anyone.
E. UNFORGEABILITY
Unforgeability guarantees that only valid group members are
able to signcrypt a message on behalf of the group. This




1 = (IDδ1·dGM )
e·δ−11 = IDGM .
Therefore, if anyone wants to sincrypt a messageM , it can
do as follows (Equation 7):
µ′ = β + (δ3)e·δ
−1
1 = β + IDGM mod n
K = H(µ′ · β) mod n
σ ′ = (K ·M )+ Gpbk mod n
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where 1,3,←$ Z∗n. Note that IDGM and Gpbk are publicly
available values, and 1 and 3 can be chosen at random
by any entity that plays the role of the signer. Therefore,
(µ′, σ ′, ′, ′1, 
′
2) is a valid signature, which is untraceable
by the GM. Since the unforgeability is broken, the coalition-
resistance is broken as well.
F. EXCULPABILITY
Exculpability property provides that no one, even the group
manager, can signcrypt on behalf of other group members.
This requirement does not hold since the manager knows
all secret values needed to generate signcrypted messages
on behalf of the user. Namely, the manager knows values
IDGM , δ3, IDU . Therefore, it is easy to generate a signature
equivalent to Equation 7:
µ = β + IDGM mod n
K = H(µ · β) mod n
σ = (K ·M )+ Gpbk mod n
 = Gδ3pbk · IDU mod n





Traceability guarantees that the group manager can find the
true signer, for any valid verified message. This requirement
does not hold since any signer can compute value  of
Equation 7 as  = Gδ3pbk · ID
3
GM mod n, where 3 ←
$ Z∗n.
This signature will be verified correctly, however, it will be
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